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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court rendered two decisions addressing issues 
of federal employment discrimination law on June 24, 2013: University 
of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar1 and Vance v. Ball 
State University.2 The opinions have many similarities: Both deal with 
analytical frameworks developed to prove and evaluate intentional 
discrimination claims; both were decided in a way that favors 
defendant employers over plaintiff employees; both were decided 5-4 
with the same majorities and dissenters; both majority opinions stated 
that the decision was likely to result in fewer trials of discrimination 
claims; both majority opinions rejected the position of the Equal 
* 2013 William R. Corbett, Frank L. Maraist Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law 
Center of Louisiana State University. I thank Gretchen Fritchie, LSU Law Center Class of 2014, 
for her assistance in the preparation of this Essay. 
1. 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). 
2. Id. at 2454. 
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Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"); and both dissents 
were authored by Justice Ginsburg and read from the bench.3 
Furthermore, the two cases prompted Justice Ginsburg to conclude 
the dissenting opinions with a call to Congress to overturn the 
decisions, as she had done in 2007 in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co.4 Apparently this strategy worked in Ledbetter, as 
President Obama signed the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 
overturning the legal principle articulated in that case. According to 
commentator Jeffrey Toobin, in Vance and Nassar Justice Ginsburg 
ran her Ledbetter play again," but he predicted it is less likely to 
succeed this time.5 
I, too, urge Congress to amend the employment discrimination 
laws, but not by running "the Ledbetter play" again. Congress should 
stop patching the employment discrimination laws by enacting 
statutes to change the law announced in specific cases. Such a nickel-
and-dime approach to reform of the law is precisely what led to the 
sharply divided decision in Nassar. Instead, Congress should take a 
page from the playbook of the United Kingdom's Parliament and 
undertake a comprehensive reform of employment discrimination 
laws, as Parliament did in the Equality Act of 2010. 
Part I of this Essay discusses the Vance and Nassar decisions, 
highlighting Justice Ginsburg's dissents calling on Congress to 
overturn the Court's holdings. As Part I discusses, commentators, too, 
for more than a decade have been calling on Congress to "fix" the 
employment discrimination law that the Court has developed. 
3. Rob Silverblatt, Justice Ginsburg's Record-Breaking Day: Ginsburg Dissents From the 
Bench in Hotly Contested Cases, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/06/25/justice-ginsburgs-record-breaking-day. 
4. 550 U.S. 618 (2007), abrogated by statute, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. In Ledbetter, 
the Court gave a grudging and strict interpretation of when a timely charge of discrimination 
alleging discriminatory pay practices must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. The Court held that the discrete act of a discriminatory pay practice triggers the 
running of the 180 (or 300) day charge-filing period; a charge must be filed within 180 days of 
each discrete discriminatory act. The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act overturned the decision by 
establishing three different events that constitute an unlawful employment practice and 
commence the running of the charge-filing period, thus more carefully tailoring the limitations 
period to the various acts of discrimination in compensation. The three events are as follows: 1) 
when a discriminatory compensation decision or practice is adopted; 2) when an individual 
becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or practice; or 3) when an individual 
is affected by such a decision or practice, including each time the individual is paid resulting 
from the decision or practice. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (2013); 29 U.S.C.§ 626(d)(3) 
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act) (2013); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), incorporating 42 U.S.C. 
2000e-5; (Americans With Disabilities Act); 29 U.S.C. §791 & 794 (Rehabilitation Act of 1973) 
(2013). 
5. Jeffrey Toobin, Will Ginsburg's Ledbetter Play Work Twice?, THE NEW YORKER (June 
25, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/06/ruth-bader-ginsburg-
ledbetter-play.html. 
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Congress has responded to several Supreme Court decisions, 
overturning or adjusting the law announced in them, most notably in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. However, as Part II discusses, the 
incremental approach of Congress's responding to one or more 
Supreme Court decisions every few years is not adequate to repair and 
modernize the employment discrimination laws of this Nation. Part II 
briefly describes the comprehensive approach of Parliament and 
recommends that Congress legislate accordingly. 
II. VANCE AND NASSAR 
A. Vance 
The issue in Vance was, "Who is a supervisor?" Is it anyone 
who has authority to direct other employees' daily work activities, or 
is it only those who have ultimate authority, such as hiring, firing, 
demoting, promoting, and so on? This question matters because 
employers can be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
19646 for sexual harassment perpetrated by their employees. When 
the harasser is a non-supervisor, the employer is liable if negligent-if 
it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take 
prompt and effective remedial action.7 However, it was generally 
believed that employers should be held liable more readily for 
harassment perpetrated by supervisors, and in 1998 the Supreme 
Court effectuated that result by announcing a standard for imposing 
liability for supervisor harassment that was more plaintiff friendly 
than the foregoing negligence standard in Burlington Industries, Inc. 
v. Ellerth8 and Faragher v. Boca Raton.9 Under the supervisor 
standard, an employer is strictly liable if the harassment results in a 
"tangible employment action," such as firing or demoting, but if no 
tangible employment action results, the employer may try to prove a 
two-part affirmative defense to avoid liability. 10 In the aftermath of 
Faragher and Ellerth, plaintiffs argued that their harassers were 
supervisors in order to benefit from the more favorable analysis. The 
circuits split on what authority a supervisor must have. 
The Vance Court held that a supervisor must have authority to 
take tangible employment actions against the victim." Although the 
6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 
(2006)). 
7. See, e.g., Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2441. 
8. 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). 
9. 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
10. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761; Farragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
11. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443. 
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Court did not think that Faragher and Ellerth resolved the issue 
before it, it did decide that the answer was implicit in the framework 
created in those cases. Because the pivotal question in the framework 
is whether a tangible employment action was taken, the Court held 
that "the strong implication" is that supervisors have the authority to 
take tangible employment actions. 12 In so holding, the Court rejected 
as ambiguous and unhelpful the EEOC's interpretation of "supervisor" 
in its Guidance. 13 
Justice Ginsburg's dissent advocated adopting the definition in 
the EEOC Guidance. She argued that the majority's definition was 
inconsistent with the assumptions about "supervisor" in prior 
decisions,14 and that it ignored "workplace realities." 15 The dissent 
contended that the majority's decision to define "supervisor" narrowly 
would "diminish[ the force of Faragher and Ellerth, ignoreH the 
conditions under which members of the work force labor, and 
disserveH the objectives of Title VII to prevent discrimination from 
infecting the Nation's workplaces." 16 
The majority and dissent disagreed about the ramifications of 
the Vance decision. The majority argued that the decision would not 
diminish protection against sexual harassment because the negligence 
standard for non-supervisor harassment provides sufficient 
protection.17 In contrast, the dissent predicted that plaintiffs who 
cannot avail themselves of the supervisor analysis will face "a 
hazardous endeavor."18 
B. Nassar 
The issue in Nassar was whether the "motivating factor" 
causation standard and the associated mixed-motives analytical 
framework apply to retaliation claims under Title VII, as they do to 
discrimination claims under the Statute. Some background is helpful 
in understanding how this issue arose. For many years, two proof 
frameworks have been used to prove and evaluate individual 
disparate-treatment claims. The first is the pretext framework 
developed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
12. Id. at 2448. 
13. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS 
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS (1999). 
14. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2462 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 2455. 
17. Id. at 2451-52. 
18. Id. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Green.19 The second is the mixed-motives framework developed by the 
Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.20 However, the Price 
Waterhouse framework was modified when, in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991,21 Congress incorporated the two parts of the mixed-motives 
analysis, "motivating factor" and the same-decision defense, into two 
new sections in Title VII. 2 2 Congress not only codified the mixed-
motives analysis, but it also selected the causation standard from 
Price Waterhouse-motivating factor rather than substantial factor-
and changed the effect of the same-decision defense, rendering it a 
limitation on monetary remedies rather than a defense to liability. 
"Motivating factor" is the threshold for the "mixed-motives" analysis, 
which generally is considered more favorable for plaintiffs than the 
pretext analysis. For two decades, the courts applied both the pretext 
and mixed-motives frameworks to disparate treatment cases under 
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). In 2009, the Court 
surprisingly held in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 23 that, 
because Congress did not amend the ADEA to include "motivating 
factor"-and "because of' means but-for causation-the mixed-motives 
framework does not apply to the ADEA. Left unanswered was the 
breadth of the holding: Did it imply that but-for causation is required 
for, and the mixed-motives analysis is inapplicable to, all employment 
discrimination provisions that have only the "because" statutory 
language? Enter Nassar. 
The plaintiff in Nassar asserted a claim for retaliation under 
Title VII after he had asserted a discrimination claim. The Fifth 
19. 411 U.S. 792, 802-07 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis is a three-step 
analysis with a shifting burden of production. First, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, 
which basically requires the plaintiff to prove that he or she is in a protected class, there is a job 
available, and the plaintiff is basically qualified to perform the job, although the elements vary 
somewhat depending on what type of adverse employment action the employer took. If the 
plaintiff satisfies the burden at the first stage, at stage two the employer bears the burden of 
production to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. If 
the defendant satisfies the burden of production at the second stage, the burden of production 
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for 
discrimination. 
20. 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989). In the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis there were 
two stages with a shifting burden of persuasion. First, the plaintiff must prove that the protected 
characteristic was a motivating or substantial factor (the case produced no majority opinion on 
the standard of causation) in the adverse employment action. Then the burden of persuasion 
shifts to the defendant, who could still win the case and avoid liability by proving the same-
decision defense-that it would have taken the same adverse action for nondiscriminatory 
reasons. 
21. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
23. 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
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Circuit had applied the mixed-motives analysis to his retaliation 
claim, rejecting the argument that Gross controlled. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that Congress did not amend the Title VII 
retaliation provision to include "motivating factor." Therefore, as the 
Court held regarding the ADEA in Gross, a plaintiff asserting a 
retaliation claim must prove that a retaliatory motive is the but-for 
cause of the adverse employment action. 
The Nassar majority examined the history of Title VII law from 
its 1964 passage, to Price Waterhouse, to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
to Gross. Turning to the structure of Title VII, the Court concluded 
that because there is no meaningful textual difference between the 
Title VII retaliation provision and the antidiscrimination provision in 
the ADEA, the conclusion, as in Gross, is that Title VII retaliation 
claims require proof of but-for causation. 24 The Court stated that the 
higher standard of causation is important to "the fair and responsible 
allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation systems." 25 
Explaining further, the Court cited the dramatic increase in 
retaliation claims filed from 1997 to 2012-more than double. The 
Court explained how an employee, fearing termination for a job-
related reason, could set up a retaliation claim by making a meritless 
claim of discrimination before the adverse action, only to claim 
retaliation for making the claim when the adverse action is taken. In 
the face of such frivolous claims, employers would have difficulty 
obtaining summary judgment under the motivating factor standard. 26 
The majority opinion also addressed two other points raised by the 
dissent. First, the Court rejected the argument that it should defer to 
the EEOC's interpretation, expressed in a guidance manual. The 
Court found that the EEOC's explanations supporting its position 
lacked the persuasive force necessary for Skidmore27 deference. 
Second, the Court rejected the argument that even if the "motivating 
factor" standard in Title VII did not control the result, the Court's 
decision in Price Waterhouse should. The majority did not think that 
Price Waterhouse survived the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991. In sum, the Court found its holding to be supported by the "text, 
structure, and history of Title VII."2 8 
Again, Justice Ginsburg dissented, focusing on the majority's 
elimination of the "symbiotic relationship" between discrimination and 
24. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531. 
25. Id. at 2532. 
26. Id. 
27. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
28. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534. 
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retaliation. 29 The dissent argued that the majority, by holding that 
retaliation was outside the scope of the motivating factor provision in 
Title VII,30 was attributing to Congress an intent at odds with 
Congress's clear purpose to strengthen Title VII in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991.31 The dissent mocked the fact that the majority 
analogized the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII and the 
ADEA in Nassar but distinguished them in Gross: "What sense can 
one make of this other than 'heads the employer wins, tails the 
employee loses'?"32 
C. Nassar and Vance Dissents: Calling on Congress to Fix It 
Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinions in both Vance and 
Nassar call upon Congress to intervene, as it has in the past, to repair 
the damage wrought by the Court's decisions. In Nassar, the dissent 
proclaimed that Nassar and Vance "should prompt yet another Civil 
Rights Restoration Act."33 The invitation to Congress was reminiscent 
of Justice Ginsburg's closing in her Ledbetter dissent: "Once again, the 
ball is in Congress' court. As in 1991, the Legislature may act to 
correct this Court's parsimonious reading of Title VII." 34 
There also has been a growing crescendo among scholars in the 
past decade or so that federal employment discrimination law is 
broken and Congress needs to fix it. And Congress has responded to 
Supreme Court opinions several times. The most far-reaching 
response by Congress was the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in which 
Congress amended Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
abrogating ten Supreme Court decisions. 35 In fairness, the 1991 Act 
did more than simply overturn cases, but it did not do enough. As 
mentioned, the Ledbetter dissent's call to Congress was answered with 
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.36 The Americans with Disabilities 
Act Amendments Act of 200837 abrogated the law announced in two 
Supreme Court decisions. 
29. Id. at 2537 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
31. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2539 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
32. Id. at 2545. 
33. Id. at 2547. 
34. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 660 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
35. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 1 (1991). 
36. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 
U.S.C.). 
37. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
12101). 
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The most curious failure of Congress to respond is the non-
passage of the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act 
("POWADA"), 38 which would have changed the law announced in 
Gross.39 Given the considerable negative reaction to the Court's 
holding that age-discrimination plaintiffs have to prove but-for 
causation,40 it is surprising that both political parties did not push 
passage of POWADA. 
Now Justice Ginsburg has twice called on Congress again to 
respond to Supreme Court decisions that reduce protections under the 
employment discrimination laws. If Congress were very sensitive to 
the Court's opinions, it might respond. Nassar seems effectively to 
ensconce the but-for causation standard for most discrimination and 
all retaliation claims. Beyond Nassar's far-reaching impact on 
discrimination law, the Court's discussion of the large volume of 
retaliation claims, the ease with which plaintiffs can assert meritless 
claims, and the need to dismiss such claims at summary judgment,41 
is a rather bald assertion that the Court intends to reduce the number 
of retaliation claims that are asserted and that go to trial. The Court 
articulated a similar intention, though not as bluntly stated, in Vance. 
The Court said that the supervisor definition would permit resolution 
of many cases as a matter of law, and plaintiffs would know before 
filing what they must prove. 42 Nonetheless, as Jeffrey Toobin points 
out, the political realities are different in 2013 than they were when 
Congress passed the Ledbetter Act.43 
III. CALLING ON CONGRESS TO FIx IT: LEGISLATE LIKE PARLIAMENT 
Although I am sympathetic to the dissent's calls for Congress 
to fix the "wayward" opinions of the Court, particularly Nassar, I do 
not think that Congress should continue its approach of simply fixing 
what it considers errant decisions. Congress should take a holistic 
view of our very complex body of employment discrimination law and 
undertake a thorough reform of it. Forget "the Ledbetter play"! Take a 
page out of the playbook of the United Kingdom's Parliament: Develop 
38. S. 1756, 111th Cong., (1st Sess. 2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong., (1st Sess. 2009). 
39. 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
40. See William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment Discrimination Law: Does the 
Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 683, 709 & 
n.127 (2010). 
41. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531. 
42. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2450. 
43. Toobin, supra note 5. 
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and enact an ambitious reform law similar to the Equality Act of 
2010.44 
A. The Inadequacy of the Ledbetter Play 
The problem with Congress's approach to fixing particular 
decisions is well illustrated by the opinions in Nassar. The majority 
interpreted Congress's amendment of specific sections of Title VII via 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to be a clear indication that those 
amendments were not intended to apply to any other sections of Title 
V1145 -precisely as the Court had reasoned in Gross regarding the 
ADEA. The dissent, on the other hand, reasoned that the narrow 
interpretation by the majority was at odds with the purpose of the 
1991 Act-to expand protections against employment discrimination. 4 6 
Why did Congress amend only Title VII by inserting the mixed-
motives analysis? Perhaps, as the dissent suggested, because it was 
reacting to Price Waterhouse, a Title VII sex-discrimination case. The 
1991 Act was Congress's most ambitious reform of the discrimination 
laws to date, yet it demonstrates that the episodic approach to fixing 
discrimination law has proven problematic and inadequate. 
The incremental approach of patching the laws not only creates 
the uncertainty evidenced in Nassar and Gross, it also means that 
Congress is not expressing views regarding many emerging theories, 
concepts, and principles developed in case law. (For example, what 
does Congress think about gender stereotyping as a theory of 
discrimination?) Nor has Congress indicated whether concepts 
developed in later-enacted laws should apply to earlier laws. Should 
the theory of "regarded as" or perceptive discrimination-expressly 
provided for in the ADA-apply to Title VII and the ADEA? 
B. Take a Page from Parliament's Playbook 
Our employment discrimination law is asymmetrical, differing 
from one statute to another, and confused. If you don't believe me, try 
to teach the course! The United Kingdom found itself in a similar 
position. With a three-decade-old body of law, featuring nine 
antidiscrimination laws described as "outdated, fragmented, 
inconsistent, inadequate, inaccessible, and at times 
44. Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, § 149 (Eng.), available at http:// 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/149.. 
45. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532. 
46. Id. at 2540 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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incomprehensible,"4 7 a research team, supported by an advisory board 
and panel of experts, undertook a year-long study that culminated in 
2000 with a detailed report recommending a single equality act.4 8 That 
report was followed by a Discrimination Law Review reaching the 
same recommendation in 2007.49 Those efforts came to fruition in 2010 
with one comprehensive law replacing the others. The particulars of 
the law are not as important here as is the approach-comprehensive. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When it enacted early discrimination laws, the U.K. studied 
and followed the model of the U.S. and Canada.50 As the oldest of our 
discrimination laws reaches its fiftieth anniversary in 2014, it is time 
for Congress to look to the U.K.'s example. As much as one may 
disagree with any single decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, running 
the Ledbetter play is no longer the answer. In the words of Justice 
Ginsburg, "The ball is in Congress's court." 
47. Bob Hepple, The New Single Equality Act in Britain, 5 THE EQUAL RIGHTS REV. 11, 13 
(2010), available at http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/bob%/ 20hepple.pdf. 
48. BOB HEPPLE ET AL., EQUALITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK 1 (2000). 
49. Hepple, supra note 47, at 14. 
50. Id. at 12. 
